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Many social, technological and biological interactions involve network relationships whose outcome
intimately depends on the structure of the network and on the strengths of the connections. Yet,
although much information is now available concerning the structure of many networks, the strengths
are more difficult to measure. Here we show that, for one particular social network, notably the
e-mail network, a suitable measure of the strength of the connections can be available. We also
propose a simple mechanism, based on positive feedback and reciprocity, that can explain the
observed behavior and that hints toward specific dynamics of formation and reinforcement of network
connections. Network data from contexts different from social sciences indicate that power-law,
and generally broad, distributions of the connection strength are ubiquitous, and the proposed
mechanism has a wide range of applicability.
PACS numbers: 05.65.+b, 89.75.-k
Networks are the most general framework to describe
technological, biological, social and other systems. The
nodes of the network (Internet routers [1], Web pages [2],
proteins [3], species [4], companies [5] and so on) are
linked by connections that are present or absent depend-
ing on the node relations we are interested in. In the case
of the Internet and of the WWW what is a connection is
clear, being cables or hyper-links. In other cases connec-
tions can depend on the definition: for example, we may
say that proteins interact if they physically stick to each
other, or if one of the two promotes the expression of the
other. Species interact by predation in food-webs and in
the case of companies one possible relation is given by
the companies’ portfolio. Social relations between indi-
viduals can be of many kinds and purposes, from busi-
ness [7, 8, 9] to mutual assistance [10] to friendships and
others. The choice of the type of relation defines the net-
work and its structure, but we need also the strength of
the connections to fully characterize the network. In the
social context, for example, the strength of a relation is
important to determine which is the best route to pass
information to or gather information from somebody else
in the system. Strong social ties may be regarded as pref-
erential and reliable information channels.
All the above networks present the small-world prop-
erty, i.e. the average distance between nodes grows only
logarithmically with the size of the network. As such,
small-world networks are usually considered optimal to
distribute or collect information. Yet, whenever some of
the connections become unreliable, the effective average
distance can become rather large [11]. Under this re-
spect the reliability of a connection, and ultimately the
robustness of the network can be assessed by the strength
of various connections. The most recent studies indeed
complement the attention to the network topology with
an investigation on the weights of edges [5, 6]. Yet, al-
though the weights of the connections are clearly very
important, their determination is a difficult task. Indeed
it is relatively easy to decide whether two individuals
are connected or not (since the existence of a link be-
tween them is essentially a binary variable). Instead it
is much more difficult to quantify the strength of such
a connection. How can we measure in an objective way
how much two people are, for example, friends to each
other? Here we show that for e-mail networks (a partic-
ular instance of social network) such a measure is possi-
ble. We believe that this example provides clues on the
mechanism by which the network connections form, de-
velop and strengthen. We also introduce a model, based
on the idea of preferential exchange, whose applicability
can in principle be extended to other contexts.
Modern computer networks are inherently social net-
works, since they link people and organizations and allow
the exchange of information and communications [12].
In particular the exchange of e-mails between people
defines a paradigmatic example of computer-supported
social network that is the object of many recent stud-
ies [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. In e-mail networks a link between
two people is established whenever they exchange an e-
mail (or a threshold number of e-mails [14]). By browsing
the e-mail folders of an individual (each folder represents
a different e-mail sender), it is easy to check that, after
a few years, the number of connections for the average
person can grow to the hundreds. A careful analysis of
the network is therefore necessary to reveal the presence
of groups with common interests and purposes and the
hierarchical organization of these groups [14, 17].
We introduce an objective measure of the strength of
the relations by keeping track of the number of e-mails
received from a given sender in somebody’s e-mail direc-
tory. The data sets that we analyze are five e-mail direc-
tories coming from our accounts and the accounts of two
other colleagues. They contain 5628 e-mails (correspond-
ing to 393 senders) collected over roughly three years,
219219 e-mails (476 senders, ten years), 16102 e-mails (113
senders, three years), 13385 e-mails (516 senders, five
years) and 21782 e-mails (207 senders, five years). Fig.1
shows the normalized histograms of the number N(k)
of people who wrote k e-mails to us and our colleagues.
As it can be seen, they are quite similar, and they can
be approximated by an algebraic behavior of the kind
N(k) ∼ k−γ with γ ∼ 1.6. Although, of course, the five
datasets contain some common acquaintances, they are
mostly uncorrelated, so that we consider them to be well
representative of the same universal behavior.
An algebraic law, rather than a simple exponential,
is usually a symptom of the presence of some form of
correlations in the dynamical process that produced the
data. How do correlations arise in this context? A very
simple mechanism that is known to produce such corre-
lations is a form of positive feedback that, in the social
context, can be described as ”good partners become bet-
ter partners”. Stated otherwise, there is a reinforcement
mechanism such that if the relation between two people
is already strong, it has more chances to become even
stronger.
To check whether this mechanism allows for the cre-
ation and reinforcement of social links in such a way to
reproduce the empirical data, we have analyzed a very
simple model. Starting from a society of S0 individu-
als, at every time-step each of them sends to the others
Mout e-mail messages, at random. The network of ac-
quaintances grows in time, and at every time-step a new
individual enters the society. The probability that indi-
vidual j sends a message to individual i is proportional
to the number k(i → j) of e-mails that j ever received
from i, that is
p(j → i) =
k(i→ j)∑
l k(l → j)
(1)
(the sum in the denominator is the total number of e-
mails ever received by j). We assigned to this rule
the name of preferential exchange. In some respect this
choice is reminiscent of the idea of preferential attach-
ment in the formation of growing scale-free networks [18],
even if, as we discuss in the following, the physical mean-
ing is rather different. More generally, the preferential
exchange is also close in spirit to the Tit-for-Tat reci-
procity strategy believed to be an important ingredient
to explain the emergence of cooperation and altruism be-
tween individuals [19].
Fig.2 shows the results of simulations with S0 = 2,
followed for 1998 time-steps, to a final size of S = 2000
individuals; at every time-step each individual sends out
Mout = 100 e-mails. As a starting condition we assume
that every new individual has already exchanged one e-
mail with everybody else: thus, the structure of the e-
mail network is trivial, being fully connected. The e-mail
distributions of random individuals in the population are
very similar to each other and all exhibit the same alge-
braic behavior N(k) ∼ k−γ with an exponent γ ∼ 1.8(2).
Noticeably the result does not depend on the choice of
the above parameters.
The solution of the model can be obtained also ana-
lytically, by means of a few approximations that allow
for the identification of the parameters relevant for the
model. Indeed, it is possible to write a rate equation for
k(j → i, t):
dk(i→ j)
dt
= Mout · p(j → i) =Mout
k(i→ j)∑
l k(l → j)
(2)
We assume that an individual receives e-mails at a con-
stant rate Min, so that the denominator in the r.h.s. of
(2) grows linearly in time: Min · t. We have verified this
linear dependence on time in our simulations, finding fur-
thermore that Min ≃ Mout. Moreover, we assume that
there is reciprocity in the e-mail exchange, that is, the
number of e-mails that i ever sent to j is proportional
to the number of e-mails that j ever sent to i. This
allows us to replace the numerator of the r.h.s. of (2)
using k(i → j) = R · k(j → i). We have verified also
this proportionality in our simulations, finding R ≃ 1,
an indication of the so-called fair reciprocity. With these
assumptions the rate equation simplifies to
dk(j → i, t)
dt
= α
k(j → i, t)
t
(3)
with α = R(Mout/Min). The solution of Eq.(3) is
k(j → i, t) =
(
t
t0
)α
. (4)
If ti (tj) is the time at which individual i (j) entered
the society, we set t0 = max(ti, tj) (and of course t0 < t).
If j is younger than i then t0 = tj and we can invert the
solution (4) to obtain
tj = t[k(j → i)]
−
1
α . (5)
Eq.(5) sets a one-to-one relation between tj and k(j → i)
that allows to use the probability conservation relation
N(k)dk = ρ(t)dt, where ρ(t) = const because new indi-
viduals are added at a constant rate. Therefore we have
that N(k) ∼ k−γ with γ = 1+ (Min/Mout)/R. If on the
contrary j is older than i, then t0 = ti and these fold-
ers should contribute to a peak of N(k) at k = (t/ti)
α
independent of j. We do not observe this peak in our
simulations: if we split the histogram of individual i into
the two contributions of people older and younger than i,
we find that they show the same algebraic behavior (data
not shown). This is due to the mean-field nature of the
above calculations. Fluctuations therefore have been ne-
glected. This does not apply in the real situation where
they are enhanced by the positive feedback mechanism.
As a consequence their combined effect drives the sys-
tem to the same distribution N(k) for individuals both
younger and older than i. In the case of perfect reci-
procity (R = 1) and if people reply to every e-mail they
receive (Min/Mout = 1), then the value of the exponent
γ = 2, close to the results from our simulations.
3Actually, some of the approximations that we made
can be safely relaxed. In particular we might assume
that, depending on the personality, some people have a
tendency to write slightly more e-mails than they receive,
i.e. Mout/Min > 1, or vice-versa (although very large or
very small values are unreasonable and we expect real
values to be close to 1); also, reciprocity could be imper-
fect, always for personality reasons, and R 6= 1 (but again
very large or small values are unreasonable; this has been
again verified in our simulations). In these cases we can
expect variations of the exponent γ, (although nothing
forbids large variations of this exponent, our expectations
are that the exponents should always be close to 2, as the
data in Fig.1 show). Changing the values of S, S0, and
Mout does not change the results in our simulation.
Our model, based on the preferential exchange ingre-
dient, reproduces rather nicely the behavior of the data
for a large range of parameter values. As previously ob-
served, this mechanism is similar to the preferential at-
tachment model proposed by Baraba´si and Albert [18] to
explain the emergence of the scale-free topology of some
networks. The mathematical similarity extends also to
some other results: if, for example, the preferential ex-
change rate equation is modified so that the numerator in
the r.h.s. of (2) becomes k(i→ j)α, then the e-mail dis-
tribution becomes a stretched exponential, as it happens
in the context of network topology [21].
Nevertheless relevant differences between the two rules
appear when considering the nature of social networks.
Firstly, preferential exchange works on a local basis,
which means that two people can increase the strength of
their link ignoring what is happening to the other links.
Instead, in the preferential attachment model the new-
comers need a full knowledge of the network degrees in
order to decide their connectivity. Secondly, and more
importantly, the rate of change of the e-mails that indi-
vidual i receives from j depends only on the number of
e-mails that traveled in the opposite direction and on the
total number of messages that j ever received (both local
quantities available to the two people). Therefore pref-
erential exchange is intrinsically symmetric, while prefer-
ential attachment divides the topology of the network in
hubs and poorly connected nodes. In summary, this is a
symmetrically cooperative model where no global infor-
mation is necessary.
Interestingly, more data have recently emerged about
the connection strengths in scientific collaborations net-
works [22], airport traffic [6] and other systems, showing
that the measured strengths are indeed power-law, or at
least-fat tail, distributed. Networks often evolve through
relations that get stronger in time thanks to positive feed-
back, that is, the more an individual (in the social con-
text) has given to another one, the more the latter is
likely to give back in return. Moreover, many networks
also grow in time. Implementing these ingredients in
a simple model nicely reproduces the qualitative (alge-
braic) behavior that we observe in real e-mail data. The
quantitative agreement is obtained when we add good
reciprocity: the exchange is a ”fair” process. We believe
that these ingredients do indeed shape social and other
networks, and the e-mail network, as a particular exam-
ple, is extremely suited to provide us with a wealth of
data that could be difficult to gather for other networks
(it has been found recently that in a sample of mailboxes
at the HP Laboratories the median number of e-mails
was 2200 indicating that a large amount of data could
be, in principle, available for analysis [20]). Moreover, we
still neglected the interplay between the dynamics over
the network, and the network structure itself, whereas we
expect, in principle, that the two should co-evolve toward
some stationary state.
At the same time we expect that in most real situa-
tions this model could be refined by introducing a more
detailed description of the process of interaction. For
example, a large variability in people attitude could be
captured by defining a local intrinsic quantity shaping
the mechanism of link reinforcement. As in the case of
the preferential attachment mechanism such generaliza-
tion does not remove the power-law nature of the prob-
ability distributions involved [23, 24, 25, 26], but rather
qualifies the kind of critical processes going on in the sys-
tem. Further work is needed in this direction, and more
data about the structure of networks and the strength of
the connections should be made available to develop and
validate models.
From a more general point of view, e-mail networks
on one hand, and simulations on the other, can help
investigate the large scale consequences of fairness and
reciprocity: these two ingredients are often deemed as
determinant in shaping social relations, yet their effects
are usually studied for small groups of people and short
times. The use of computers, both as data resources and
as simulation tools, can easily bring these studies to large
scales.
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